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Making the Visual Visible in Philosophy of
Science*,
Annamaria Carusi
As data-intensive and computational science become increasingly
established as the dominant mode of conducting scientific research,
visualisations of data and of the outcomes of science become
increasingly prominent in mediating knowledge in the scientific arena.
This position piece advocates that more aention should be paid
to the epistemological role of visualisations beyond their being a
cognitive aid to understanding, but as playing a crucial role in the
formation of evidence for scientific claims. The new generation of
computational and informational visualisations and imaging techniques
challenges the philosophy of science to re-think its position on
three key distinctions: the qualitative/quantitative distinction, the
subjective/objective distinction, and the causal/non-causal distinction.
Current science is characterized by the almost exclusive use of data in digital
form, with the overwhelming quantities of data referred to as the “data deluge”
largely arising due to the deployment of digital tools and, techniques, and
computational methods (Hey and Trefethen 2003). We have become used to
talking about data in terms of hundreds of terabytes and tens of petabytes,
and in all forms of research new ways of storing, retrieving, organizing and
processing these huge quantities of data are in constant demand. Some see this
as a new paradigm of scientific method: data-driven or data-intensive science
which is re-shaping our understanding of what it means to be a scientist and
to do scientific research (Hey, Tansley, and Tolle 2009). If this is so, the visual
will play a crucial role in this emerging mode of conducting science as visual
renderings of all forms mediate and shape scientists’ access to data.
There is an irony in this. The huge quantities of digital data and the
computing know-how and power to deal with them promise new insights and
breakthroughs in science by sheer dint of quantification. But as the models and
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simulations carry out their work, the whole immense edifice of quantification
is turned inside out into a qualitative visual rendering. Alongside the huge
quantities of data has grown also a plethora of images and visualizations in
all forms. Rather than receding into the background, the visual has gained in
prominence. Computationally mediated science is awash with images.
As important as the science being conducted is the production of
computational and engineering resources for imaging and visualisation. The
discourse in which these developments are embedded has for some time
now made frequent appeal to the cognitive enhancement brought about by
computational methods for visually rendering data. For example:
Scientists need an alternative to numbers. A technical reality
today and a cognitive imperative tomorrow is the use of images.
The ability of scientists to visualize complex computations and
simulations is absolutely essential to ensure the integrity of
analyses, to provoke insights, and to communicate those insights
with others. (De Fanti and Brown 1991, 252)
Psychological accounts of imaging and visualization oen draw upon an implicit
computational theory of mind. For example:
Visualizations can expand processing capability by using the
resources of the visual system directly. Or they can work indirectly
by oﬀloading work from cognition or reducing working memory
requirements for a task by allowing the working memory to be
external and visual. (Card, Mackinlay, and Shneiderman 1999, 16)
Developers of visualising tools and techniques in engineering and computer
science are sensitive to the need for an appropriate theory of vision to
accompany the technology.1 However, computational theories and metaphors
of vision, of cognition, and of mind are widespread in the field, and talk of
“high-bandwidth vision” capable of taking in information in the form of “bytes”
which must be “processed” is very common. The eﬀects of the conception of
vision understood through the prism of computationalmetaphors in this domain
and the ways in which this metaphorical framing becomes concretised in the
design of these visualisations are not yet well understood. Two points especially
demand our aention: the first is that cognitivist-computational theories tend
to isolate vision as a psychological phenomenon, whereas for the epistemology
of science, it is necessary to understand how vision works embedded in
epistemic contexts, as playing a crucial role in the formation of evidence for
claims. Second, cognitivist-computational theories tend to remain locked into
1 See, for example, C. Johnson, Top scientific sisualization research problems. IEEE Computer
Graphics and Applications 24(4) (2004): 13-17.
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representationalist theories of vision and of visual artefacts, which generally do
not do justice to the constructed, interactive, and material embodied way in
which these work in scientific contexts.
The further irony is that even though the visual is everywhere in
data-intensive science, it somehow remains in an epistemological blind spot.
What follows is a series of suggestions for bringing the visual into view.
The philosophy of science needs to find ways of aending to the visual
which treat it as having a problematic of its own, rather than being merely
an appendage to the “real” scientific work which is carried out elsewhere.
In 1996, in the Introduction to Picturing Knowledge, Baigrie noted that “the
supposition persists that the pictures in science are psychological devices that
serve as heuristic aids when reasoning breaks down” (xviii). Despite increasing
aention to representation, of which van Fraassen’s Scientific Representation:
Paradoxes of Perspective (2008) is a notable example, aention to the visual
as such is still scarce in philosophy of science today. Philosophers who have
focused specifically on computational science oen mention how important
visualisations are (for example, Winsberg 1999), but just how deeply they
contribute to shaping the epistemology of computational science is still
underestimated (though touched upon in several essays in Lenhard, Küppers,
and Shinn 2006).2 What I envisage in the context of this brief position piece is
to set out what it might mean to take seriously the role of visualisations in the
context of computationally intensive science; that is, to appreciate their crucial
and irreducible role in establishing scientific claims. By this I mean a twofold
study: on the one hand, a study of the ways in which visual evidence operates
in computational science, and on the other, a study of the ways in which this
mode of doing science plays a role in constituting the objects of science.
It is important to try to understand the diﬀerent modes of visualising in
science: image processing, scientific visualisation, and information visualisation
each have diﬀerent ways of connecting to data and information, and to the
research object or domain under investigation. These are very diﬀerent visual
renderings. The distinctions are oen drawn along the lines of technologies and
renderings we are already familiar with: for example, by distinguishing between
those elements that aremore akin to photographswhich are seen to be operating
in a causal relation with that which is depicted, and those which are more akin
2 There are of course exceptions. Some recent examples oen focus on the visual as a cognitive
aid to understanding [for example, J. Kulvicki, Knowing with Images: Medium and Message,
Philosophy of Science 77(2) (2010): 295-313], or include the visual under the rubric of
the materiality of models: see, for example, T. Knuuila, Modelling and representing: An
artefactual approach to model-based representation, Studies In History and Philosophy of
Science Part A 42(2) (2011): 262-71; M. Vorms, Representing with imaginary models: Formats
maer, Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42(2) (2011): 287-95; and several
essays in Lenhard, Küppers, and Shinn (2006).
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to graphs operating in an informational mode with respect to what is depicted.
The existence or not of a corresponding physical object is another touchstone of
this distinction: an x-ray of a heart has such an object, whereas a graph of the
rate of increase of taxation over the last 5 years does not. The term “image” is
oen used of the first, and “information visualization” for the second, whereas
“scientific visualisation” is used for those cases where there is a physical object
which is simulated, and the visualisation is of the simulation rather than directly
of the physical object. However, all of these ways of drawing these distinctions
fail to capture the complexity of visual artifacts which are produced by multiple
causal and computational criss-crossing lines. For example, the visualisation
of a computational simulation not only has both image-like and graph-like
elements, but combines them in ways that make it impossible to distinguish
between them (Carusi and Hoel forthcoming). Similarly, the algorithms used
in image processing mean that the resulting visual rendering is a hybrid of the
causal and the computational. We need to find ways of re-thinking the diﬀerent
configurations of causal and informational or computational rather than trying
to tackle the question by sorting them neatly into one box labelled “cause” and
another labelled “everything else.” The visual hybrids which are now endemic
in science challenge us at deeper levels too. It is necessary to re-think or even
give up three of the central distinctions in the epistemology of science. These
are: the distinction between the quantitative and the qualitative, between the
subjective and the objective, and finally, between the causal and the non-causal
(understood variously as information, meaning, reason). These three distinctions
are complexly inter-related in ways which this short position piece cannot fully
analyse. I aim only to point towards possible research directions.
First, the distinction between the qualitative and the quantitative: I
started out by talking about huge quantities of data being made tractable
through qualitative visual renderings. alitative/quantitative reversals are
the characteristic feature of digital visualisations of all kinds, occurring at
diﬀerent levels and in diﬀerent ways. During the process of developing the
technology, there will be continuous interplay between data in quantitative
form, the algorithms for processing the data and producing the visualisation,
and the qualitative visual evaluation of the progress of the algorithm formation.
A similar process occurs in the actual use of visualisations in scientific
contexts. The typical screen display, for example, is not only of a visual
still or movie, but will also contain interfaces with quantitative parameter
displays. The qualitative/quantitative distinction is also oen seen in terms of
a continuous/discrete distinction: for example, the simulation of mathematical
models involves moving back and forth between equations for continuous
phenomena, the discretisation required for the computer simulation, and the
visualisation which is again in continuous form. Thus the discrete is turned
into the continuous, and the continuous back into the discrete in a constant
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transformation, each cycle bringing about modifications and variations that
inter-inform each other. There is not a straightforward one-way pipeline
through the development of visualisation technology, nor through its use in
a scientific seing. Instead, the process constantly doubles back onto itself,
and there is an ongoing and reciprocal inflection of quantitative/discrete and
qualitative/continuous, with each modifying the other.
Second, the distinction between the subjective and the objective: this oen
follows in the footsteps of the qualitative/quantitative distinction. Despite the
widespread reliance on the visual, distrust of the visual is still commonplace
precisely because it is seen as subjective, and therefore variable. Visualisations
are oen seen as temporary stopping points on the way towards the surer
grounds of quantitatively couched answers, which have the objectivity that
subjective perception is not seen to have, precisely because these answers
appear to be invariable. For example, in information visualisation, the detection
of paerns through the morass of huge quantities of data is carried out
visually and qualitatively, by people (as opposed to by other computers). This
is exactly what is pointed out as the huge advantage of visualisations in
the cognitive-computational paradigm. However, the gold standard remains
the numerical investigation of the paerns because it replaces subjectivity by
objectivity. It promises a view from nowhere, undistorted by the inevitable
cognitive limitations of individual people, or of groups of people. For this
reason it appears to replace subjectivity by objectivity (Spencer 2011). However,
following on the dissolution of the quantitative/qualitative distinction, it is less
obvious that a clear distinction between the subjective and the objective can be
upheld. This is closely inter-related with the third distinction to be considered.
As Daston and Galison (2007) have shown, the alignment of the objective with
the causal with the mechanistic, precisely because machines seem to exclude
subjective bias, has been crucial to the formation of the epistemology of modern
science. The advent of computational science throws this neat alignment further
into disarray.
Third, the distinction between causal and non-causal: the second term
in this distinction has been interpreted variously as relating to meaning,
intention, or reason throughout the history of science, but in the context of
computational science, it is oen interpreted as relating to information. For
example, Barberousse, Franceschelli and Imbert draw a distinction between
dataE (“produced by physical interactions with measuring or detecting devices”)
and dataA (“about a physical system”) (2009, 560). However, it is diﬀicult to
hold these two apart in information visualisation, in image processing, or in
computational visualisation at the points of visualisation construction and
interpretation.
The use of images in a human science, classics, is an interesting starting
point in this investigation. The images of an ancient document in the form of
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a wooden stylus tablet, the Frisian tablet, incorporated algorithms which were
designed to mimic the motion made by papyrologists when they hold the tablet
in the palm of their hands and “li it up at eye level against a light source
and apply pitch-and-yaw motions to the artefact” (Tarte et al 2010, 139-40).
There are many causal reasons relating to the depth of the incision in the
tablet and the angle of the light as it is rocked back and forth which make
this a fruitful practice for these papyrologists, but let us try to analyse what
we have here: these causal interactions between hand, tablet, incisions, light,
which are mathematically embodied in the algorithms for the image processing,
are grounded in the concrete interpretative practice which made them salient
(among all the other causal interactions possible in that context). Even in the
palm of the hand, there is an interplay of the causal and the intentional—in both
the sense of intendings (purposeful action) and of meanings, that is the targets
of the interpretive practice. Embodied in the algorithm for image processing,
there is a hybridity of causal factors (the way in which the algorithm organises
shapes and contours in the image) and intentional/informational factors. The
resultant images that are viewed for further interpretation are a hybrid of causal
and non-causal factors, since in observing and inspecting them, there is no way
of holding apart, in vision, what has been fused through material practice and
technology, and the feedback and feedforward loops between them. Indeed, the
image is in its turn interacted with materially, as the papyrologists trace with
their fingers and through gestures the incisions made visible through the image
processing as they engage with the images for further interpretations (de La Flor
et al. 2010). This amalgam of the causal and the non-causal is not limited to the
human sciences, but only more likely to be reflected upon there. The question is
to understand how it operates across the sciences.3
Another example is the computational mesh that is used to run simulations
and generate visualisations in simulations of all kinds. As applied to the
investigation of cardiac electrophysiology, these meshes combine the results
of histological images, algorithmic image processing techniques, and numerical
simulation techniques, which in their turn are designed with a view to the
mathematical models that must be solved through the simulation, and the
experimental data that parameterise the models (described in detail in Carusi,
Burrage and Rodriguez 2012). In these meshes and the resultant simulations
and visualisations, the causal and the informational feed into one another at
every turn, and it is this inter-relation that demands our aention. There is
a real question regarding whether they can be picked apart in anything but
the most artificial fashion. If they cannot be, we cannot judge how much their
3 This is the topic of an article by P. Humphreys, What are data about? In Computer Simulations
and the Changing Face of Scientific Experimentation, eds. Juan Duran and Eckhart Arnold,
(Cambridge Scholars Publishing, forthcoming).
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separate contributions can be depended upon in science, how much epistemic
warrant they separately aﬀord. Let us rather turn to understanding how they
are inter-related.
A further task is to deepen the understanding of information in
computational scientific seings. Information can be understood in a variety
of diﬀerent ways (Floridi 2008). The notion of information always brings in
a relational element since it implies not only that there is something about
which the information is, but also something or someone for which or for
whom it is information. A common distinction is between data and information,
where information is understood as data made meaningful, already organised
and arranged in some way. On this conception, information always implies
a point of view, an interest, a question in terms of which data is made
meaningful. For something to be information, there must be an “appreciator”
of the information. Shannon’s theory of information in mathematical terms,
which has informed so much of computer science, places this “for whom” in the
shadows (Shannon and Weaver 1949); ordinary talk of information will oen
aribute this “appreciation” to the computer (“the computer thinks that this
is a contour,” “the computer bunches those things together,” and so on), and
the aribution of a form of agency to computational entities is the topic of
heated debate in the philosophy of information.4 Without entering into this
debate, it is interesting to note that the understanding of the non-causal as
information in this more relational sense harks to a more full-blown agency.
For example, with computer programmes that are not limited to processing
information, but operate on it in diﬀerent ways, some of which may involve
the ability to “make choices” or “take decisions” or “act” autonomously. It is in
this sense that they are seen as agents, or agent-like. Agency has been jealously
guarded as belonging exclusively to humans or higher beings, so the idea of
extending it to computational entities is indeed radical. But it is not radical
in the conception of agency that is put forward, since it still ties agency to
discretely existing entities, be they computers or humans, whose agency results
from acting autonomously (and therefore not mechanistically). A rather more
interesting view of agency in the development, use, and circulation of digital
and computational visualisations is oﬀered by considering the subjective as
not “housed” in humans or groups of humans, nor in computers or clusters of
parallel computers, but as distributed across an epistemic-technological-social
system. What might be treated as information is not a maer for any form of
agency alone since what the computer might count as information cannot but
be formed by what counts to its user as information, and how it processes that
4 See C. Ess, ed., Luciano Floridi’s philosophy of information and information ethics: Critical
reflections and the state of the art, Special Issue of Ethics and Information Technology 10(3)
(2008): 89-204.
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information cannot but be an amalgam of the computational processes and the
human and social processes of constructing science. The visual system is not just
somehow in the minds (or brains) of isolated individuals viewing the outcomes
of visualisation technologies; it is in the whole distributed system interlinked
through soware and nervous system, embedded in the overarching epistemic
apparatus of the specific science or even of the specific research question.
The challenge of the new digital and computational visualisations for
science lies therefore in a challenge to philosophical accounts of knowledge.
Individualistic accounts of knowledge in science have long been undermined
by the thoroughly collective nature of science; the social epistemology which
has resulted needs one further string in its bow: the technologies that are used
for scientific knowledge. The technologies for visualisation play a particularly
important role here, because they bring it about that groups of people share
not only visual displays, but common modes of perceiving them, and common
modes of moving between perception and knowledge (Carusi 2008).
What, then, is needed for a philosophy of science that is able to account for
the role of the new generation of visual artefacts in the epistemology of science?
Firstly, it is necessary to reconsider what epistemic presumptions are being
made about distinctions such as qualitative/quantitative, subjective/objective
and causal/non-causal (and no doubt others) in philosophy as well as in science
and technology. Secondly, it is necessary to gain a beer understanding of
the relation between diﬀerent modalities of knowledge (linguistic, numerical,
algorithmic, visual) and the interplay between them. Thirdly, these modalities of
knowledge need to be considered within the broader socio-epistemic-technical
seings in which they are embedded.
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